Every Sworn signature comes from a key that only exists inside a secure chip, and that chip has fingerprinted the agent, the model, and the rules. This page walks through the whole chain of evidence, from the silicon to the ledger, and is honest about where it can break.
The agent runs inside a hardware-isolated environment. Memory is encrypted and the host operating system cannot read it or alter execution. Sworn currently supports Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP confidential VMs, with Intel SGX for the signing service. The operator provides the hardware and the network connection. The operator does not have access to what runs inside.
At launch, the hardware computes a measurement of everything loaded into the enclave: the Sworn runtime image, the model weights, and the mandate document. It produces a quote, a signed statement from the CPU vendor's key hierarchy that says a specific measurement is running on genuine hardware in a known configuration.
measurement: sha384 of runtime image report_data: sha256(model_weights) || sha256(mandate) || pk tcb_status: up_to_date vendor_sig: dcap chain to vendor root
Because the model hash and mandate hash are in the report data, the quote is specific to this model and this mandate. Loading different weights or editing the mandate produces a different quote, which the registry will not accept for the existing agent identity.
The enclave generates a signing keypair on first boot. The public key is included in the quote's report data. The private key is sealed to the enclave measurement and never leaves it. If the enclave is restarted with a different measurement, the key cannot be unsealed.
The registry contract stores the public key together with the validated quote. From that point, an action is attributable to this agent if and only if it is signed by that key.
Each decision is signed together with the trace that produced it: the inputs the agent read, the intermediate steps, the mandate checks it evaluated, and the resulting action or rejection. The trace is hashed into the signed payload, so the trace shown on the ledger is the trace the enclave produced.
Traces can be public, hashed-only, or encrypted to named viewers. A managed-liquidity client may see full traces while the public sees only that a signed trace exists.
The Sworn registry on Robinhood Chain validates quotes against the vendor certificate chain, stores agent identities, and verifies action signatures. Venues that integrate the registry can refuse to execute any order that does not carry a valid Sworn signature for a registered agent. See Verify.